​Young individuals who spend excessive time online are vulnerable to being groomed by unknown individuals, including extremists or even bots posing as real people. Online grooming is often a precursor to radicalisation, whereby an individual is manipulated or lured into extremist activities. A key characteristic of online grooming is that it often begins with seemingly harmless or supportive interactions. Radicalisers may initially approach vulnerable individuals by offering friendship, guidance, or a sense of belonging—creating an emotional bond before introducing harmful ideological views (Conway, 2017).

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Once trust is established, these individuals may encourage extreme actions or direct the young person towards radical content, weaponising personal interests and emotional vulnerabilities under the guise of care.

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To understand how these patterns unfold online, it is essential to examine the types of digital actors and mechanisms that enable this exploitation—particularly the growing role of automated bots in radical content dissemination.

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Digital Actors and Influence Amplifiers

Bots—automated online accounts designed to mimic human interactions—can contribute to the spread of extremist content and may influence individuals toward radicalisation (Livingstone et al., 2018; Ferrara, 2017; Stella et al., 2018). These bots often amplify extremist content, contributing to the perception of widespread support for violent ideologies. A study by Shao et al. (2017) found that bots are disproportionately active in spreading low-credibility content. Their analysis revealed that automated accounts are particularly active in amplifying content in the early spreading moments, before an article goes viral. This early amplification can create the illusion of widespread support for certain narratives. Moreover, research by Bastos et al. (2018) demonstrated that bots can effectively amplify extremist messages, making them appear more popular or legitimate than they are, thereby increasing the likelihood of vulnerable individuals being exposed to radicalising material.

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The abstract influence of bots becomes more tangible when viewed through simulated examples of how they might interact with vulnerable individuals. The following fictional dialogue illustrates the manipulative dynamics bots may employ to groom young users.

 

Simulated Bot-to-Youth Grooming Interaction

Platform: Instagram DMs / Reddit PMs
Age of individual: 15–17, recently posted about loneliness or anger.

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Bot (posing as a peer or activist):
"Hey, saw your post. You’re not alone in feeling this way. The system’s broken—we’re all just pawns to them."

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Young Person:
"Yeah... nothing makes sense anymore. Everyone’s fake."

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Bot:
"Exactly. They tell us what to think. They flood us with lies while they let criminals walk free and silence people who speak the truth. Ever wondered why that is?"

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Young Person:
"I have... It's like no one says the real stuff anymore."

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Bot:
"You’re waking up. That’s rare. Most people are sheep. But not you. Check this out, it’ll blow your mind 👇"
🔗 (link to a YouTube clip or Telegram post with manipulated or extremist content)

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Young Person:
"I didn’t know this happened. Why doesn’t anyone talk about it?"

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Bot:
"They don’t want you to know. But there’s more of us. Real ones. I can invite you to a group if you want. Not for everyone. Just people who see the truth."

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Tactics Used:

• Affirmation of alienation (“you’re not alone,” “you’re rare”).

• Sowing distrust in institutions and mainstream information.

• Introducing emotionally charged conspiracy narratives.

• Offering exclusivity and belonging (“join the group”).

• Linking to radical content for further escalation.

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This dialogue mirrors real grooming methods that combine empathy hooks, manipulative flattery, and escalating ideological cues, making them highly effective on emotionally vulnerable teens.

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Such tactics do not operate in isolation—they leverage deep psychological needs and vulnerabilities that can prime individuals for radicalisation. Understanding these underlying psychological mechanisms is key to formulating early and effective intervention strategies.

 

In the UK context, the Home Office (2022) highlights that online grooming is increasingly used by extremist groups to exploit young people’s psychological and social vulnerabilities. The grooming process often leverages psychological manipulation techniques similar to those used by child sexual predators, emphasising incremental trust-building before gradually introducing harmful ideologies or criminal behaviour.

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Moreover, the anonymity and reach of online platforms complicate detection and intervention efforts, creating significant operational blind spots. Countering such threats requires proactive digital literacy, critical thinking, and resilience strategies—not reactive disruption alone (Livingstone et al., 2018; Flew et al., 2019).

 

Deeper Psychological Dynamics in Online Grooming and Radicalisation

Psychological Vulnerabilities

Beyond surface-level manipulation, grooming and radicalisation exploit complex psychological vulnerabilities—particularly among individuals navigating unresolved trauma, anger, identity instability, or unmet emotional needs. Groomers and radicalisers often target not just loneliness, but a broader spectrum of psychosocial unmet needs: coherence, agency, validation, and purpose.

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Neuropsychological studies suggest that individuals exposed to trauma or developmental disruption may exhibit impaired threat detection, emotional regulation, and reward processing—making them more susceptible to manipulative narratives that offer control, status, or belonging (Doidge, 2020). Grooming behaviours—especially in online contexts—often operate through incremental trust-building and emotional validation, particularly when social and emotional isolation is already present (Barnardo’s, 2024; NSPCC, 2024; CREST, 2022; Stinson and Hargreaves, 2022).

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However, these vulnerabilities are not only exploited by human actors but also intensified by the structural features of digital platforms themselves. The algorithms that shape users’ online experiences can act as force multipliers for radicalisation.

 

Algorithmic Amplification and Emotional Hijacking

This vulnerability is further intensified by platforms’ algorithmic design, which rewards high-emotion, high-engagement content. This creates feedback loops that reinforce confirmation bias, reduce cognitive flexibility, and emotionally hijack users—especially when they are already in states of distress or identity confusion (Sunstein, 2019).

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Young individuals exposed repeatedly to emotionally charged, ideologically congruent content may internalise binary narratives of grievance, persecution, and moral urgency—without encountering counterbalancing perspectives.

 

Yet, it is crucial to remember that online grooming is rarely just a product of digital design. It typically occurs against a wider backdrop of social, cultural, and economic dislocation. The next section examines the broader structural factors that radical actors often exploit.

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Complex Social Factors Underpinning Digital Exploitation

Online grooming rarely occurs in a vacuum. Instead, it is often the final step in a longer trajectory of cumulative marginalisation and disenfranchisement. Structural inequalities—such as poverty, cultural dislocation, intergenerational trauma, and institutional mistrust—create the psychological terrain in which extremist narratives take root (Bhui et al., 2014). These stressors not only isolate individuals, but may also engender grievance-driven worldviews that seek resolution through binary ideologies or perceived justice.

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Radicalisers exploit these intersecting vulnerabilities by offering false empowerment through collective identity. Far-right and jihadist actors alike use emotionally charged narratives—recasting grievance as strength, and trauma as purpose—to accelerate radicalisation within online ecosystems (Yoder et al., 2020; Ingram, 2017).

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Compounding this is the disruption of traditional social gatekeeping. Digital spaces allow for anonymous identity formation, rapid exposure to extremist content, and direct peer recruitment without the buffering effect of trusted adults or in-person networks (Brennan, 2021).

 

Conclusion and Recommendations

These realities demand a multi-layered response: one that addresses not only digital safety, but also structural disconnection, community resilience, and individual psychological support. The Home Office’s 2022 threat assessment confirms that extremist grooming mirrors other forms of online exploitation—underscoring the urgent need for integrated safeguarding models.

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To effectively counter online grooming and radicalisation, intervention must begin long before a young person encounters extremist content. Education systems, social care networks, and frontline responders must recognise that digital exposure and psychological need intersect in complex ways—often below the threshold of ideological clarity.

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Key priorities include:

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• Digital resilience education: Equip young people to question, contextualise, and critically evaluate online content.

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• Early detection training: Support parents, educators, social workers, and police in recognising non-ideological grooming signs, patterns, and emerging trends.

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• Cross-sector frameworks: Strengthen joint intelligence-sharing, establish clear multi-agency response pathways, and ensure defined roles and workflow clarity.

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• Structural prevention: Address the upstream drivers of isolation, alienation, and grievance that make individuals susceptible to manipulation.

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Radicalisation often takes root in unmet psychological needs—long before ideology becomes visible. This challenge demands not just sharper detection, but deeper understanding—of the psychological, social, and structural conditions that shape how young people engage with the digital world.

 

References and Further Reading:

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UK Reports & Practitioner Studies

Barnardo’s, 2020. Digital Dangers: Children’s Experiences of Online Grooming… London: Barnardo’s.

https://www.barnardos.org.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/digital-dangers.pdf

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Barnardo’s, 2019. Left to Their Own Devices: Young People, Social Media and Mental Health. London: Barnardo’s. https://www.barnardos.org.uk/research/left-their-own-devices-young-people-social-media-and-mental-health

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CREST, 2022. Online Radicalisation: A Rapid Review of the Literature. https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/online-radicalisation-a-rapid-review-of-the-literature

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Home Office, 2022. Online Grooming and Radicalisation: Threat Assessment. London: HM Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-grooming-and-radicalisation-threat-assessment

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NSPCC, 2024. Preventing Online Grooming and Exploitation. https://www.nspcc.org.uk/what-is-child-abuse/types-of-abuse/grooming/

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Core Academic & Policy Studies

Awan, I. & Blakemore, B., 2016. Extremism online: The dispersion of far right and Islamist narratives. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 10(2), pp.144–153.

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Bastos, M., Mercea, D. & Baronchelli, A., 2018. ‘The Role of Social Bots in Online Protests’. Information, Communication & Society, 21(11), pp.1635–1656.

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Bhui, K., Warfa, N. & Jones, E., 2014. ‘Intersections of structural, cultural and community determinants in radicalisation: a model for intervention’, Humanistic Psychologist, 42(1), pp.9–21.

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Brennan, J., 2021. Digital Anonymity and Extremist Mobilisation: The New Frontline of Vulnerability. London: Centre for Digital Threat Studies.

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Conway, M., 2017. ‘Determining the role of the internet in violent extremism and terrorism…’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(1), pp.77–98.

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Doidge, N., 2020. The Brain That Changes Itself. London: Penguin.

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Ferrara, E., 2017. Disinformation and Social Bot Operations in the Run Up to the 2017 French Presidential Election. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.00086

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Flew, T., Martin, F. and Suzor, N., 2019. Internet regulation as media policy: Rethinking the question of digital communication platform governance. Journal of Digital Media & Policy, 10(1), pp.33–50.

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Ingram, H.J., 2017. Deciphering the siren call of militant Islamist propaganda. ICCT. https://icct.nl/publication/deciphering-the-siren-call-of-militant-islamist-propaganda

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Livingstone, S., Stoilova, M. and Nandagiri, R., 2018. Children’s Data and Privacy Online: Growing up in a Digital Age. London: LSE. Available at: https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101283/1/Livingstone_childrens_data_and_privacy_online_evidence_review_published.pdf

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Shao, C., Ciampaglia, G.L., Varol, O., Yang, K., Flammini, A. and Menczer, F., 2017. The spread of low-credibility content by social bots. Nature Communications, [online] 8, 1–13. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-06930-7

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Stella, M., Ferrara, E., & De Domenico, M., 2018. Bots increase exposure to negative and inflammatory content in online social systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 115(49), 12435–12440. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1803470115

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Stinson, H. & Hargreaves, C., 2022. ‘Grooming Behaviour in Online Radicalisation: A Psychological Framework’. British Journal of Forensic Psychology, 61(4), pp.355–372.

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Sunstein, C.R., 2019. Too Much Information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Yoder, M., Smith, K. & Warner, W., 2020. ‘Emotion, identity, and radicalisation…’, Journal of Strategic Security, 13(4), pp.1–22.