Rethinking Counter-Terrorism: Beyond Ideology—Violence, Vulnerability, and Deterrence in the Age of Hybrid Threats
By: Magda Maszczynska, Director of the Deterrence Center
The Southport attack (29th July 2024), and the more recent trial of the perpetrator Axel Rudakabana sparked a debate whether a spree killing motivated by fascination with violence should be classed as terrorism (Home Office and Jarvis, 2025; De Simone, 2025). The Southport attack was a horrific act of violence that terrorised children, teachers, families, local community and the whole country. It was not however an act of terrorism.
Online exposure to violence, together with other environmental and individual factors, can evoke a propensity towards violence. This article explores the evolving landscape of violent extremism, particularly in cases where violence is not clearly underpinned by ideological motives, but instead emerges from psychological, social, and digital vulnerabilities. Through the lens of Rudakabana's case, this analysis critically examines the conceptual and operational constraints of existing counter-terrorism and safeguarding frameworks in addressing this complex and ambiguous category of threat.
The objectives of this article are to:
· Question the assumption that ideology is a necessary precursor to terrorism, and assess whether individuals motivated by a fixation on violence alone may still pose substantial threats to national security.
· Reassert the critical distinction between violence as a behaviour, and ideology as a structured belief system, cautioning against the dangerous conflation of the two within policy, legal frameworks, and public discourse.
· Examine the structural and operational challenges within counter terrorism frameworks—particularly the difficulties in identifying, referring, and managing individuals whose behaviours do not fit established definitions of extremism or terrorism.
· Propose a deterrence model that prioritises agile cross-sector collaboration, education, digital and emotional literacy, community-based resilience, mental health intervention, and collaboration as essential pillars of the prevention of domestic extremism and terrorism.
· Inspire interoperability — a renewed strategic mindset within the government —emphasising not only the capacity, but the operational ability, emotional intelligence, and interdisciplinary awareness necessary to detect and deter emerging forms of hybrid threats.
Mass Harm, Mixed Motives: The Operational Dilemma in Categorising Modern Threats.
Key Terms and Definitions for Operational Use
Terrorism is defined as criminal actions undertaken by an individual or a group that are driven by a cause. A cause refers to the underlying reason or motivation that leads individuals or groups to commit terrorist acts. These causes can be complex and vary widely depending on context. They often stem from an ideology or a worldview - to live in a certain way, and often how other people should live their lives. The aim is to achieve wider political, societal or religious gains. An example of a cause is political oppression and lack of representation- some groups may resort to terrorism to fight for political rights or autonomy (for instance the Irish Republican Army (IRA) used violence to protest British rule in Northern Ireland). Another well know example of a cause is religious extremism and/or radical ideology. Groups like ISIS or Al-Qaeda carried out attacks believing they were justified by their religious beliefs.
Terrorism is usually driven by a combination of causes or factors. In our modern, highly globalised world, a cause and effect may take place in different geographical locations. For example, foreign occupation or military intervention may lead to protests, and even terrorism, in response to perceived foreign aggression. Western military presence in the Middle East, for example, has often been cited by some terrorist groups as a justification for retaliatory violence.
Another important driver of affiliation with terrorist or organised crime groups lies in how poverty and lack of education are contextualised beyond their immediate and socio-economic impacts. In some regions, terrorist groups exploit poverty by framing it within deeper structural and systemic injustices to recruit members. Disenfranchised youth, facing few alternatives for advancement, may be drawn to extremist narratives promising purpose, belonging, and material support. Boko Haram, for instance, has reportedly offered money, food, or protection in exchange for allegiance, effectively filling the void left by weakened or absent state institutions. This exemplifies how structural deprivation can serve as fertile ground for radicalisation when exploited by ideologically driven actors.
Moreover, terrorists are often directly or indirectly affected by perceived notions of injustice, polarisation, victimhood, hate, retribution, and change. Through attacking random people, terrorising the public, shouting religious or ideological slogans, and in some cases, killing themselves; terrorists aim to highlight the cause behind the attack, and evoke a desired change.
Violence can be broadly defined as any act that causes or threatens physical harm, often involving weapons or methods intended to instil fear or distress. Examples of violent offences include assault, sexual assault or rape, domestic violence, firearm and knife-related crimes, robbery, murder, stalking, harassment, and hate crimes. Within criminology, spree killers—who kill multiple individuals in a single event—are distinct from serial killers, who kill one person at a time, with some down time in between the acts. Although spree killings may resemble acts of terrorism, their motivations are typically rooted in individual cognition, personal gratification, and propensity towards violent acts. In some cases, mental incapacity or insanity may later be questioned in court regarding one’s criminal responsibility and awareness of their actions (the M’Naghten Rule).
While Rudakabana’s case lacks clear ideological motives, it shares several psychological features commonly observed in terrorist behaviour. A broader psychological landscape— merging both nature and nurture factors that led to increased susceptibility to radicalisation, includes perceived injustice and a desire for retribution. In such contexts, violence may become both a form of expression and a means of asserting identity or resistance. This suggests that radicalisation towards violence can occur even in the absence of an ideology.
Some individuals, therefore, may engage in extreme violence not as part of an organised cause, but in reaction to personal alienation, grievance, or psychological distress. The term Lone Mass Violence Actor (LMVA) captures this phenomenon; an individual who acts alone, often without ideological aims, but who commits high-impact violence. These actions may or may not be premeditated, but are often rooted in psychological or emotional instability rather than collective ideologies. This is referred to as idiosyncratic radicalisation—a process where an individual’s trajectory toward violence is shaped by personal, often opaque, experiences and motivations rather than collective ideologies or movements (Cassam, 2018; Borum, 2011). This concept challenges the assumption that all violent extremism must stem from identifiable ideological currents. Instead, these cases often reveal how individual psychological and social factors can produce violent outcomes that mimic terrorism without fitting its definitional boundaries (Gill et al., 2014).
A forensic analysis of Rudakabana’s digital devices revealed a disturbing archive of violent material, including graphic depictions of historical atrocities such as the Mau Mau uprising, the Rwandan genocide, and ethnic violence in Somalia, as well as imagery from global conflicts like the Gaza–Israel crisis and the Balkan Wars (Halliday et al., 2025; Moritz, 2025; Kherbane, 2025). His obsession extended to videos of murder, torture, and content mocking religious groups, indicating a sustained and morbid fascination with violence, domination, and human suffering. The prosecution suggested that the attack may have been driven not by ideology but by a personal fixation on violence “as an end in itself” (Merseyside Police, 2025; CPS, 2025). This hypothesis is reinforced by his continued aggression in custody, including a violent assault on a prison officer at HMP Belmarsh (Ahmed, 2025; Lamche and Kotecha, 2025), suggesting psychological disturbance rather than ideological radicalisation.
Beyond Ideology: Rethinking Violence, Risk, and Radicalisation
Counter-Terrorism Policing (CTP) is responsible for identifying individuals at risk of radicalisation through the UK’s CONTEST strategy, which includes the Prevent programme. Yet Prevent is uniquely challenging terrain; while policing traditionally operates within a law enforcement framework, Prevent occupies a pre-crime space where no offence has yet occurred and no law is being enforced. This makes both assessment and action inherently complex for agencies accustomed to evidence-based thresholds and criminal justice processes.
Despite being referred to Prevent multiple times from the age of thirteen for behaviours like bringing weapons to school, discussing violent content, and assaulting others, Axel Rudakabana’s case was repeatedly dismissed due to a lack of clear ideological motives. This missed opportunity to intervene became evident when, following his attack, CTP struggled to find a clear explanation for his actions (CTP, 2025). The Prevent Learning Review (2025) identified significant gaps in the system, highlighting the over-reliance on identifying explicit ideological extremism rather than addressing behavioural risks and vulnerabilities.
Despite documented evidence of Rudakabana’s fixation on violence and possession of a list of individuals who had bullied him—indicative of targeted aggression—the case was not escalated to Channel, the multi-agency programme designed to support individuals at risk. This failure to act underlines the need for a more flexible, nuanced approach that considers both ideological and non-ideological factors in preventing harm, emphasising the importance of interoperability and comprehensive threat detection across agencies.
The current laws that deal with violence provide certain enforcement and punishment powers available to the police, investigators, prosecution, and judges, yet are not as powerful as the counter-terrorism laws, especially the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT), and its ongoing fortifications. The latter encompasses a stronger deterrence effect and tougher punishment of terrorists and those supporting terrorism. The UK’s counter terrorism legal framework represents a strong stance of the state against terrorism, and provides a range of options to protect national security.
Whilst violence appears to be the main component of some of the terrorist attacks, it is not the cause of terrorism. Whilst the Police look for motives in violent spree killers, Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) and MI5 search for causes in terrorists. It is our current jurisprudential understanding that terrorists are motivated by a cause or ideology. Until now, spree killers have not been considered terrorists, due to lack of underlying ideological beliefs of changing the system or the society and the way we live. Generally speaking, terrorists engage in actions of spree killings. Spree killers terrorise the population. Spree killers are not terrorists. Spree killers do not commit their acts to endanger national security and/or usher in a regime change.
For example, the individuals who carried out attacks at London Bridge and Borough Market in 2017, as well as the assailant at Fishmongers’ Hall in 2019, were motivated by extremist ideologies connected to religious, social, and political grievances. The London Bridge attackers were described as “motivated by Islamist extremist ideology” and influenced by propaganda aimed at causing mass harm (Home Office, 2018). The Fishmongers’ Hall attacker was identified by CTP as being inspired by Islamist extremism and seeking to commit violence in alignment with this worldview (CTP, 2019). Such perpetrators often act out of perceived injustice, grief, and disenfranchisement, embracing martyrdom with the belief they are sacrificing themselves for a larger cause.
In contrast, Rudakabana’s case revealed no coherent ideological framework, yet he shared other personal and contextual factors commonly associated with radicalisation, such as perceived sense of injustice, disenfranchisement, and other vulnerabilities. Statements by Merseyside Police and CTP North West described his motivations as stemming from personal grievance, isolation, and psychological instability (Merseyside Police, 2024; CTPNW, 2024). Emotional and psychological responses to such conditions can, in some cases, evolve into behaviours observed in acts of terrorism, particularly the use of targeted violence to assert agency, identity, or control.
This raises a challenging question: Should a persistent interest in violence, coupled with psychosocial vulnerabilities, trigger CTP concern in the absence of ideology? Traditionally, ideology has served as the framework for violent extremism. However, cases like Rudakabana's disrupt that paradigm. His actions lacked the structured vision typically associated with terrorism, raising questions about the appropriate legal response. While TACT provides broad investigatory powers, indiscriminate application risks undermining legal clarity and distorting threat levels. Such misclassifications could also misallocate resources, blurring distinctions between violent crime, terrorism, and domestic threats.
Arguments against labelling violence as an ideology are grounded in concerns about the potential overreach and unintended consequences of such a redefinition. Jonathan Hall KC, the UK's Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (2025), warned that expanding terrorism definitions could mischaracterise individuals, restrict freedom of expression, and overwhelm MI5 and police resources. He further emphasised that TACT’s scope is already wide, and careless expansion could lead to misuse and erosion of public trust. This perspective resonates with recent Home Office discourse on ‘idiosyncratic radicalisation’—a process arising from emotional dislocation rather than a coherent extremist ideology (Home Office, 2023).
This view is supported by scholarly analyses that emphasise the importance of understanding psychological and social factors distinct from ideological narratives in threat assessment (Huckerby & O’Brien, 2020; Borum, 2011). Rather than redefining terrorism, policies should address root causes—marginalisation, mental health crises, and social fragmentation—to uphold justice, societal values, and restore public confidence in counter-terrorism.
While the Rudakabana case may appear anomalous, parallels can be drawn with other global incidents of mass violence. Elliot Rodger, for example, combined personal grievance, mental health struggles, and online misogyny into a deadly rampage in California (2014), reflecting what some scholars have termed ‘idiosyncratic radicalisation.’ Likewise, Adam Lanza’s path to violence at Sandy Hook (2012) was shaped more by psychological isolation and exposure to violent media than any coherent ideology. These cases, alongside others such as Nikolas Cruz (Parkland, 2018) and Dylan Klebold (Columbine, 1999), demonstrate the pressing need to reframe mass violence as a complex, hybridised threat category—one that merges emotional pain, digital immersion, and social disconnection.
From a criminological perspective, Rudakabana’s case disrupts binary models of terrorism versus criminal violence. An updated and more nuanced understanding of criminogenic vulnerability is needed; one that accounts for the complex interplay between individual cognition, external influence, institutional response, and social context. Deterring modern forms of spree violence (non-ideological mass violence) requires moving beyond narrow frameworks of radicalisation and embracing integrated, multi-agency strategy that targets both internal and external drivers of violence.
The current national security architecture, shaped by classical threat models and securitisation theory (Buzan et al., 1998), often fails to detect non-ideological but operationally dangerous threats. This represents an epistemological blind spot between what is securitised and what is actually threatening. Risk governance theory (Beck, 1992; Renn, 2008) offers a compelling lens for understanding this shift: we are transitioning from clearly bounded risks to a diffuse and hybridised threat environment, in which actors like Rudakabana do not fit standard typologies. Therefore, a revised counter-terrorism strategy must embrace a risk-based, rather than ideology-based approach, capable of identifying and disrupting violence regardless of its narrative packaging.
From Social Fragmentation to Digital Polarisation: Drivers of Contemporary Violence
The convergence of modern risk factors—including digital detachment, deepening socio-economic inequality, ideological fragmentation, and institutional weakness—has created an environment where violence can emerge in diffuse and unpredictable ways. Escalating digital immersion, particularly among young people, has led to a growing detachment from real-world interactions, with much of their socialisation, identity formation, and emotional regulation now taking place online.
This shift, coupled with declining community cohesion and rising digital vulnerabilities, exacerbates the risk of violence. Research by Armstead et al. (2021) demonstrates that the erosion of social bonds correlates with rising interpersonal conflict, while online spaces— often manipulated by foreign actors, bots, and algorithmic reinforcement—serve as breeding grounds for polarising content and violent behaviours. These digital spaces are further amplified by real-world risk factors like substance abuse, inequality, gang affiliation, and the availability of weapons (Giorgianni, 2011). Together, they blur the boundaries between online fantasy and real-world harm, particularly for individuals already navigating personal hardship or social alienation.
Moreover, socio-economic disparities—such as restricted access to education, healthcare, stable housing and employment—serve as significant stressors, fuelling perceptions of injustice and exclusion. These grievances are often co-opted and magnified in digital communities, where extremist narratives flourish, including those associated with misogynist Incel subcultures or Far-Right movements.
The increasing polarisation of political discourse, driven by radical rhetoric, misinformation, and algorithms, further fractures society and creates ideological silos. In such conditions, vulnerable individuals may come to view violence not as deviant, but as a legitimate form of resistance or self-assertion. Simultaneously, weak and overburdened legal systems, alongside ineffective or mistrusted law enforcement, erode public confidence in formal justice mechanisms, pushing some toward vigilantism and self-administered justice.
The Unseen Curriculum: Online Influence, Vulnerabilities, and the Limits of Law and Safeguarding
Educational disruption
Rudakabana’s educational disruption, including school exclusion and prolonged absences, played a critical role in his social isolation and online immersion. Research shows that adolescents facing such disruptions often spend more time on the internet, where prolonged exposure to violent media can shape distorted worldviews, heightening feelings of fear and injustice (Kuss & Griffiths, 2017; Borum, 2011). This vulnerability is further compounded by a lack of educational support, which can make young individuals more susceptible to radicalisation, as extremist groups exploit their desire for belonging and identity (CPRLV, 2018). Studies have also linked school expulsion to increased risks of criminal behaviour and radicalisation, with disconnected youth often seeking purpose in antisocial or violent ideologies (Gase et al., 2016). The absence of structured educational environments and the loss of protective social bonds can leave adolescents vulnerable to engaging with extremist content online, reinforcing their potential pathways to criminality and extremism.
The Hidden Costs of Educational Disruption: Online Vulnerability, Isolation, and Radicalisation
Exposure to violent content online
Despite the absence of traditional precursors to violence such as war or state collapse, the UK faces a new kind of threat: unregulated, graphic, and algorithmically amplified exposure to violence online. Court evidence in Rudakabana’s case revealed that his actions were not ideologically driven but rooted in a personal obsession with violence—an obsession likely reinforced by the constant stream of disturbing content across digital platforms. In today’s environment, especially for youth, the digital realm has become more influential than real-life surroundings, yet remains poorly understood by many safeguarding professionals.
Algorithms, echo chambers, and low-content moderation allow violent, polarising, or extremist material to flourish, shaping beliefs, desensitising viewers, and potentially pushing vulnerable individuals toward harmful behaviour (O’Callaghan et al., 2015; Bartlett & Miller, 2012).
While law enforcement and institutional frameworks have become more effective at addressing threats in the physical world, digital spaces still remain largely unregulated and difficult to monitor. Young people, in particular, increasingly engage in high-frequency, low-depth interactions online, often at the expense of face-to-face communication—once a vital space for emotional expression, dialogue, and the constructive reframing of potentially harmful thoughts. This decline in meaningful interpersonal engagement in the 3D world, coupled with the isolating nature of online environments, may contribute to the emergence of both ideological and non-ideological forms of violence—depending largely on the online spaces and communities individuals are exposed to.
Harmful Content and Lack of Controls
Influencing has never been easier
The current lack of effective legislation and law enforcement in the cyber domain makes it relatively easy to access and disseminate harmful and criminal content online. The internet’s impact on criminal behaviour has raised concerns globally, as cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crimes increase, and violent, extremist materials remain easily accessible. In the case of Axel Rudakabana, it is plausible that his violent tendencies were exacerbated by prolonged exposure to such content and interactions with like-minded individuals in digital spaces, making it more likely for him to commit his crimes. Online environments often serve as spaces where individuals are attracted, manipulated, or even instructed in committing serious criminal acts. At the same time, the erosion of meaningful face-to-face communication, growing social isolation, and increasing polarisation contribute to feelings of alienation, which some seek to alleviate by turning to online communities. These digital spaces, though offering a sense of validation, can further marginalise individuals and make them more susceptible to radicalisation and exploitation by those seeking to exploit their grievances.
Digital Influences: How Online Exposure to Violence and Extremist Content Shapes Youth Behaviour
Grooming and Radicalisation via Online Interactions
Neurodiversity and vulnerability
Neurodiversity refers to the natural variation in human brain functioning, encompassing conditions such as autism spectrum disorder (ASD), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and dyslexia. Recognising neurodiversity emphasises difference rather than deficit, but it also requires awareness of the distinct support needs some individuals may have, particularly in high-stress or socially complex environments.
Neurodevelopmental conditions (or neurodevelopmental disorders) are a group of conditions that begin in early childhood and affect the development of the brain and nervous system. These conditions often impact thinking, behaviour, learning, communication, and social functioning—sometimes in subtle ways, other times more profoundly. While these conditions do not inherently lead to violence, they can affect social understanding, emotional regulation, and stress tolerance—particularly when left unsupported or misunderstood. In combination with digital isolation, exposure to violence online, bullying, or perceived injustice, they may heighten the risk of internalised distress escalating into externalised action. Individuals in a susceptible state—particularly those facing social isolation, emotional distress, or unresolved trauma—may become increasingly open to manipulative narratives that frame violence as a solution or form of agency.
Read more: Neurodiversity and Vulnerability to Violence and Radicalisation
There is growing evidence that prolonged exposure to violent online content—particularly among young people—can increase aggression, shape hostile worldviews, and reduce empathy, creating conditions that may facilitate violent behaviour in real life. Studies have linked antisocial media use to malicious online conduct and increased real-world aggression, especially among those with low empathy and a high hostile attribution bias (Qiu et al., 2024; Oshodi, 2024).
These behavioural shifts echo earlier insights into violent offenders like Ted Bundy, who traced his fascination with violence to consuming violent pornography, illustrating how environmental stimuli can interact with predispositions. Supporting this, the American Academy of Paediatrics (2009) and Kelly et al. (2007) found that sustained exposure to media violence not only desensitises viewers but also disrupts brain functions related to impulse control and emotional regulation.
‘You are either with us or against us’- Polarisation, cancel culture and diminishing social bonds
The phrase “you are either with us or against us” encapsulates the growing polarisation in contemporary societies, driven by some public figures and leaders who endorse combative and exclusionary rhetoric. Such behaviour normalises hostility and aggression, with extremist groups exploiting these divides to target specific individuals or communities. Vulnerable individuals, particularly those experiencing social alienation or emotional distress, may see these narratives as validation for their harmful actions, as seen in the case of Axel Rudakabana.
The process of radicalisation often begins with perceived injustice, isolation, and moral disengagement, amplified in online echo chambers. As globalisation and economic instability fuel fear and fragmentation, the ability to engage in open, respectful dialogue deteriorates, particularly among younger generations immersed in digital spaces. This shift from meaningful social interactions to superficial online connections deepens feelings of loneliness and disconnection. Combined with exposure to radicalising content and psychological vulnerabilities, this environment can foster self-radicalisation, as individuals feel justified in their actions by online communities with manipulative or dangerous agendas. Ultimately, violence committed by individuals like Rudakabana can be seen as a desperate attempt to assert agency in a world where they feel powerless and unseen, rooted in fear, grief, and disillusionment, not reasoned dissent.
Together, these findings reinforce the critical need to recognise the role of digital environments as formative influences—especially for vulnerable individuals navigating adolescence, trauma, or identity development. With limited real-time policing, inadequate tech accountability, and a lack of coordinated digital safeguarding, online provocateurs—whether human or bot—can manipulate and incite violence with near impunity, leaving law enforcement struggling to respond before real-world harm occurs.
Greater research is needed into how violent and coercive online environments affect vulnerable and disenfranchised individuals. Just as urgently, we must expand our understanding of neurodiversity—and learn how to support the specific vulnerabilities associated with different neurodiverse conditions—so that those affected can receive the tailored support they need. Cognitive and emotional differences must not be left unrecognised, misunderstood, or exploited by extremist narratives.
The Strategic Consequences of Language and Labelling in Counter-Terrorism
Language in counter-terrorism is not neutral. Terms like vulnerability, susceptibility, and radicalisation shape public attitudes and institutional responses—and influence how individuals see themselves. A shift in terminology can reframe someone from needing support to posing a risk. In Rudakabana’s case, his school flagged him as “extremely vulnerable,” yet a lack of multi-agency coordination and changing perceptions meant signs of distress were overlooked.
Labels can carry real psychological and social consequences. Being seen as a potential extremist may alienate young people, damage peer relationships, and breed mistrust in authorities (Williams, 2017). This may create a self-fulfilling prophecy, where individuals internalise the negative labels and begin to exhibit the behaviours associated with them. This dynamic is well-documented in stigma research, where harmful labels often reinforce the very behaviours they seek to prevent (Corrigan & Watson, 2002; Link & Phelan, 2001).
Prevent and Channel referrals, though well-intentioned, can backfire if not handled with sensitivity. Repeated referrals, feelings of being singled out—particularly among Muslim youth—and the absence of meaningful follow-up support have all been linked to increased isolation and alienation (Bhui et al., 2016; Kundnani, 2015; Awan & Zempi, 2020; Qurashi, 2018). Furthermore, in some cases, young people report internalising a sense of criminality or being ostracised by their peers, particularly when referrals are perceived as unjust or poorly explained (Qurashi, 2018).
The inconsistent application of terms like ‘extremism’ has compounded these issues further, contributing to public confusion and deepening community distrust—particularly in the context of Prevent (Qurashi, 2018; Heath-Kelly, 2017). When practitioners interpret labels differently, it creates a fragmented response landscape where individuals may be over- or under-referred, undermining both legitimacy and effectiveness. This is not just a communications issue—it’s a strategic one. Clear, consistent terminology is essential to ensure proportionality, build public confidence, and avoid unnecessary escalation.
Avoiding these unintended outcomes requires early, collaborative interventions involving educators, mental health practitioners, and community leaders—not just security professionals. Without this, labels risk becoming bureaucratic tools that obscure complexity and push vulnerable individuals further to the margins. In a landscape of hybrid threats, effective language and practice require the development of professional capabilities through enhanced training, interoperability, and a comprehensive understanding of the complexities involved. Effective deterrence depends on fully grasping the nature of the threats we seek to address; without this, our efforts may prove inadequate.
Ultimately, language does not merely describe individuals—it shapes how institutions respond to them. In today’s complex threat environment, rigid labelling can obscure more than it reveals. An overly legalistic or binary view risks turning human vulnerability into a bureaucratic checkbox—alienating the very individuals most in need of connection, understanding, and support.
Conclusions
To confront emerging threats, it is essential to understand the foundational human elements at play—namely, the value of life and the protective power of social bonds. These are central to developing effective deterrence strategies against mass violence and terrorism. Individuals who commit such acts often display a profound disregard for human life, shaped by personal grievances, ideological beliefs, or psychological distress (Horgan, 2014). Educational institutions, communities, and families play a vital role in fostering empathy, respect, and belonging—all of which are essential for countering violence. In the absence of these social anchors, individuals may turn to radical groups that offer a distorted sense of purpose, particularly when they feel they have ‘nothing to lose’ (Borum, 2011).
Rising levels of loneliness and mental health challenges underscore the urgent need to strengthen social connection and resilience. Individuals vulnerable to radicalisation are often drawn to groups that exploit emotional isolation—offering a false sense of belonging while subtly introducing extremist narratives (Koehler, 2017). This reinforces the importance of fostering inclusive communities and cultivating a shared sense of responsibility, not only to prevent violence, but to actively deter it.
Law enforcement alone cannot prevent acts of radicalisation or violence; a broader societal effort is required—one in which every sector plays a role in discouraging extremist ideologies. By fostering empathy and strengthening community engagement, societies can reduce the appeal of violence and extremist beliefs. While individual social bonds are vital, it is equally important to recognise how the wider normalisation of aggression—through media, political rhetoric, and everyday interactions—erodes those very connections and creates fertile ground for radicalisation.
Emotions such as anger, loneliness, and disenfranchisement are powerful drivers of violence, particularly in fragmented societies (Bjørgo, 2011; Gill, Horgan, and Deckert, 2014). In such contexts, violence may be perceived as a form of expression, agency, or control. To counter this, deterrence must extend beyond punitive measures and embrace early, holistic interventions. Preventing violence is a shared societal responsibility. Simple acts of connection—listening, mentoring, inclusion—can be transformative (van der Heide, 2017). Crucially, research shows it is the certainty of support, not the severity of punishment, that most effectively deters harmful behaviour (Weine et al., 2016).
Deterrence is a strategic approach aimed at preventing harmful actions before they occur—by convincing potential aggressors that the risks and consequences outweigh any perceived benefits. Ideally, efforts to deter radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism should begin early—within homes, schools, and friends’ groups, where trust, care, and guidance are most impactful. However, not everyone grows up in an environment where such support is available, consistent, or accessible.
Effective deterrence, therefore, demands a coordinated, multi-agency strategy led by government authorities, integrating intelligence, law enforcement, mental health services, social care, education, and community partners. True deterrence goes beyond prevention; it requires a smart, adaptive framework grounded in resource sharing, interoperability, and agile implementation.
The Southport case and others like it have exposed an urgent vulnerability in the UK’s national security architecture: we are not adequately prepared to intercept individuals operating outside traditional ideological frameworks, yet still on a clear trajectory toward violence. Axel Rudakabana's path - from concern to catastrophe - was marked not by a structured belief system, but by isolation, obsession with violent content, and unaddressed vulnerabilities. That no single agency intervened in time was not a failure of capacity—it was a failure of coordinated capability.
Violence is not an ideology, and we must resist any rhetorical or legal shifts that suggest otherwise. To do so would risk legitimising raw aggression as a worldview, allowing criminal intent to hide behind pseudo-political cloaks. Violence is a tactic, a reaction, a signal of breakdown in an individual’s moral or psychological state. Labelling it an ideology grants it far more dignity than it deserves—and obscures the root causes we must identify and disrupt.
Deterrence extends beyond possessing the necessary tools; it involves understanding how, when, and where to apply them. This requires a workforce equipped with foresight, flexibility, and fortitude. As one terrorist leader noted, “You have to be lucky all the time. We only have to be lucky once.” The stakes are that high.
This is a wake-up call. What failed in Southport was not a lack of referrals, but the failure to connect, comprehend, and cohere. The future of national security will not be determined solely by algorithms or intelligence intercepts, but by whether we are willing to evolve: from siloed processes to integrated deterrence; from ideologically rigid definitions to adaptable, threat-focused strategy.
The government's response, including a review of the Prevent strategy and discussions about potential legislative changes, reflects an awareness of the evolving nature of threats. However, there's a delicate balance between enhancing security and maintaining the principles of justice and freedom (Home Office, 2025).
The digital sphere is a frontline in modern radicalisation, but also a legal and ethical minefield, where efforts to intervene must balance the urgency of harm prevention with civil liberties, including data privacy, encryption, and freedom of expression. Rather than focusing only on blame or control, positioning platforms as necessary partners in national security strategy - tech companies should not be seen solely as liabilities, but as intelligence partners. This approach reflects growing recognition in both policy and academic circles, with the UK Government’s Online Harms White Paper and scholars alike advocating collaborative, transparent, and accountable shared-responsibility models that balance online safety and freedom of expression (Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, 2019; Binns, 2019; Moore, 2020).
Digital radicalisation demands a digital deterrence strategy. Law enforcement, educators, and civil society must be supported to navigate online threats without infringing on rights. This includes anonymised threat assessment teams, youth digital literacy campaigns, and ethical data-sharing partnerships with tech platforms. Holding digital spaces accountable requires more than regulation—it demands agile, rights-conscious collaboration to detect, defuse, and prevent harm before it spreads.
This work invites a paradigm shift—from securitising ideology to safeguarding vulnerabilities across complex, intersecting systems of influence. That shift is difficult but essential for meaningful prevention and community resilience.
Let us be clear: this is not about expanding surveillance or criminalising thought. This is about mission-readiness in a new era. Counter-terrorism today must become multi-disciplinary, emotionally literate, and community-attuned—while retaining the discipline, structure, and tactical edge of a coordinated force. This is not peacetime policing; it is a form of preventative conflict resolution.
To protect the nation, we must do more than deter—we must disrupt, disengage, and dissuade. And we must do it together.
Recommendations
While the following recommendations aim to strengthen deterrence and early intervention capabilities, they must be situated within the real-world context of finite resources, competing priorities and capacity challenges faced by frontline services. Effective implementation requires a phased, scalable approach tailored to local realities.
Key limitations must be acknowledged: budget and political appetite may limit rollout without sustained lobbying or a crisis-driven mandate; cross-agency data sharing still faces legal and trust barriers—even with anonymisation; and digital culture training is urgently needed but difficult to standardise—what’s emerging today may be obsolete tomorrow.
1. Shifting Focus Beyond Ideological Labels
Operational clarity demands that we stop waiting for ideology to present itself before we act. Non-ideological mass violence can emerge even in the absence of a coherent ideological belief system—rooted instead in unresolved grievance, psychological trauma, or a desire to assert significance through destruction. In the context of UK counter-terrorism, this includes individuals on a trajectory toward targeted attacks, spree killings, or ideologically ambiguous acts that mirror terrorism in impact but defy traditional categorisation. A robust deterrence strategy must recognise that radicalisation often begins with emotional dislocation, not political doctrine.
Counter Terrorism Policing, as a collaborative network of UK police forces working alongside security and intelligence agencies to protect the public from terrorism, must evolve to recognise a wider spectrum of warning signs—including sustained engagement with extremist content, obsession with violent methodologies, and a range of vulnerabilities. These should not be dismissed as minor anomalies awaiting ideological confirmation, but understood as credible precursors to mass harm. Contemporary hybrid threats may originate not only from recognisable terrorist ideologies alone, but also from disinformation, foreign state interference, radical online subcultures, and targeted psychological manipulation. At this critical juncture, coordinated multi-agency involvement is essential.
2. Improving Multi-Agency Collaboration
Unity of effort must become a strategic imperative. To effectively respond to the complex and often non-linear pathways into radicalisation, sectors such as education, safeguarding, health, community services, intelligence, and policing must operate as a network. Barriers such as inter- and intra- agency frictions, fragmented communication, and ambiguity around remits—must be addressed to foster operational coherence.
Proposed developments include:
Establishment of a Prevent Multi-Agency Support Network: A streamlined, adaptable model of experts and single points of contact (SPOCs) embedded within key services (e.g., education, CAMHS, youth justice, policing, social care), enabling early-stage consultation without requiring full-panel escalation.
Development of cross-agency training programmes to build shared understanding of roles and responsibilities, decision thresholds, and intervention frameworks, supporting confident, collaborative working.
Regular joint webinars, workshops, and conferences to disseminate emerging threat trends (e.g. Incel ideology, gamified violence, disinformation), share case learning, and highlight research-informed practice.
Rather than structural overhaul, what is needed is a shared operational culture built on trust, accountability, and a collective commitment to early, proportionate, and human-centred intervention.
3. Enhancing Deterrence Capabilities
Deterrence is more than presence—it is pressure. Not on the agencies, but on those who intend us harm. Integrated deterrence means optimising how we use resources and collaborate to demotivate, dissuade, and deter individuals contemplating violence. Deterrence must evolve into a smart, data-informed capability. By incorporating behavioural insights, threat scoring, and structured decision-making models, agencies can focus limited capacity where harm is most likely to escalate.
Agencies should be supported to build targeted capability through scalable, modular training programs and knowledge-sharing platforms—leveraging digital learning, secondments, and cross-agency collaboration to minimise cost and duplication. Capacity already exists in tools like Prevent, Channel, and MAPPA. Existing frameworks provide a foundation; what is needed now is enhanced capability, sharpened through continuous professional development, scenario-based training, and a multi-disciplinary approach to countering terrorism. Deterrence is a strategic posture — not a passive hope. Its credibility lies in consistent, visible readiness.
4. Raising Awareness of the Impact of Language and Semantics
How we talk about threat shapes how we respond to it. The careless deployment of terms like ‘terrorism’ can provoke political overreaction, hinder accurate threat analysis, and even radicalise through stigmatisation. Strategic communication must be rooted in truth, precision, and restraint. Policymakers, law enforcement and the media must recognise that the words we choose can escalate or de-escalate both public emotion and adversarial response. Rhetorical overreach is a tactical liability.
Clear, consistent terminology is not merely a communications concern—it is essential to building legitimacy, fostering partnership, and ensuring proportionality in intervention.
· Create an inter-agency lexicon of high-risk behavioural terms with agreed definitions and thresholds for action.
· Require CPD and frontline training to include semantic calibration exercises to ensure consistent interpretation of referral language.
· Include clear descriptors for case triage, e.g., differentiating between vulnerability requiring welfare support and susceptibility requiring risk assessment.
5. Addressing Multi-Factor Vulnerabilities
Deterrence begins with diagnosis. An individual’s pathway to violence is rarely linear—it is layered, intersectional, and deeply personal. Mental health, social alienation, digital exposure, family dysfunction, and personal crisis often collide to create dangerous momentum. Agencies must adopt a whole-person assessment model. Every referral must be treated as a strategic intelligence opportunity: to map vulnerabilities, deploy tailored interventions, and extract actionable insights to reduce any potential for escalation from thought to action. Additionally, systematically analysing referral data will enable the identification of emerging patterns and trends in radicalisation, further enhancing preventative capabilities. These analytical findings can then inform multi-agency deterrence efforts.
6. Integrating Youth Insight into Policy and Practice
Young people’s experiences, digital engagement, and identity formation are central to the dynamics of contemporary radicalisation. Effective prevention strategies must be informed by a nuanced understanding of the digital environments and cultural contexts in which youth operate. Policymakers often face challenges in fully appreciating the complexities and rapid evolution of these digital spaces, which can result in policy responses that lack resonance or efficacy.
Bridging this gap requires systematic integration of youth perspectives—both supportive and critical—through meaningful engagement with young people and digital culture experts. Such engagement ensures that safeguarding and intervention frameworks are informed by the realities of youth experience rather than assumptions or stereotypes. This approach enhances the relevance, cultural sensitivity, and legitimacy of policy measures.
Incorporating youth insight fosters greater trust and cooperation between young populations and practitioners, facilitating interventions that are empathetic, appropriately targeted, and timely. Ultimately, embedding these perspectives strengthens the capacity of multi-agency responses to prevent radicalisation in ways that are both operationally effective and socially legitimate.
7. Community Engagement and Building Resilience
Intelligence is not only what we gather—it is what we are given. Strong local networks, built on trust, reciprocity, and consistent engagement, serve as early-warning systems and engines of resilience. Community-led initiatives and multi-agency partnerships with trusted local actors demonstrate how tactical collaboration can transform passive bystanders into active guardians. Deterrence is not just what police do to the community—it is what they build together.
In times of heightened pressure—whether due to operational fallout, high-profile cases, or community tensions—these networks are indispensable. Community representatives can act as strategic communicators and trusted intermediaries, using their networks to defuse misinformation, contextualise operational actions, and prevent harmful generalisations. They help mitigate distrust, explain intent, and maintain social cohesion at times when public confidence in agencies may be under strain. Deterrence is not just what police do to the community—it is what they build together.
8. Resource-Smart Strategy Design
Countering terrorism and hybrid threats requires strategic resourcing and interdepartmental funding coordination. Efforts must align with the missions of existing public services—such as education, mental health, and social care—to reduce duplication and increase cost-efficiency. Strategic deterrence should not depend on building parallel systems, but on integrating intelligently within existing structures. Pilot initiatives should be supported by robust cost–benefit frameworks and cross-government collaboration. Engaging commissioners, local authorities, and voluntary sector partners from the outset is essential to ensure feasibility, operational alignment, and long-term buy-in.
9: Digital Strategy and Online Safeguarding
The digital domain is no longer peripheral to national security—for many it is a primary theatre of influence, radicalisation, and potential harm. This signals a critical shift in approach; tech companies should not be seen solely as liabilities, but as critical intelligence partners. A shared-risk model of online harm prevention—grounded in ethical oversight, transparency, and rights-respecting response—is both feasible and urgently needed in today’s rapidly evolving digital landscape.
A. Digital Early Warning and Threat Monitoring
· Explore collaboration with platforms to develop non-invasive pattern-recognition systems that can help flag potential indicators of harm (e.g., engagement with violent content, escalating grievance rhetoric).
· Draw on existing tools and frameworks to guide and inform effective practice.
· Consider establishing regional “Digital Threat Assessment” teams within Prevent frameworks to support the triage of online behaviour as part of a comprehensive risk assessment.
· Recognise the risks associated with automation—such as false positives, bias, and loss of contextual nuance—and mitigate these by combining automated detection with robust human oversight, regular algorithmic audits, and reporting.
B. Community-Based Digital Literacy Campaigns
· Collaborate with schools, youth groups, and civil society organisations to deliver “digital resilience” education focused on recognising misinformation, manipulation, and extremist grooming tactics.
· Integrate engaging digital security modules into PSHE or life-skills curricula to build young people’s critical skills in navigating online environments.
C. Support Ethical Tech Regulation
· Advocate for transparency and accountability measures, including platform-level audits, public algorithm impact assessments, and independent content moderation boards.
· Encourage the development of national policies that clearly define harm thresholds and specify civil or regulatory consequences for platform inaction (e.g. Online Safety Act-style frameworks).
D. Train Frontline Practitioners in Online Culture
· Develop CPD modules to improve understanding of how radicalisation narratives spread across platforms such as Discord, Reddit, and TikTok.
· Include training on recognising emerging symbols, memes, and coded language used within online subcultures.
· Equip practitioners with strategies to engage youth immersed in these digital environments in ways that avoid alienation and build trust.
10. Disengagement Pathways
Effective deterrence must extend beyond early intervention to include well-defined, compassionate pathways for disengagement. Attention should be given to what happens after a referral—ensuring sustained, tailored support for individuals seeking to exit radical or violent environments (both online and in the real world). This includes tailored mentorship, trauma-informed care, and community reintegration programmes that address underlying vulnerabilities and foster resilience. Drawing on proven models such as EXIT programmes in Scandinavia and select probation methodologies here at home can offer valuable insights into building scalable, evidence-based approaches that empower individuals to shift their online engagement toward positive content that provides meaningful reinforcement, reducing the risk of re-engagement with harmful material.
11. Evaluation and Accountability Mechanisms
Smart deterrence must be evidence-led, not assumption-driven. To ensure policy relevance, public legitimacy, and operational effectiveness, all preventative and multi-agency initiatives should incorporate structured evaluation and accountability mechanisms from the outset.
Proposed mechanisms:
· Independent impact assessments. These should be embedded in the design of pilot projects and tools—covering both short-term outputs (e.g. referrals, de-escalation success) and longer-term outcomes (e.g. disengagement, community trust).
· Post-referral audits (with anonymised case studies) that track multi-agency responses and outcomes—identifying bottlenecks, missed opportunities, or best practices.
· Feedback loops from service users, particularly young people or those who disengage from risk trajectories, to inform how interventions are experienced on the ground. These should be anonymised and gathered with informed consent.
· An inter-agency “learning board” tasked with reviewing data patterns, ensuring alignment across partners, and adjusting operational guidance based on real-world results.
On data and privacy:
Accountability must not come at the cost of civil liberties or operational security. Data collection should:
· Be pseudonymised or anonymised whenever possible.
· Comply with UK GDPR and human rights obligations.
· Focus on aggregated trends and systemic process improvements, not individual profiling.
· Ensure that security-sensitive material is handled by cleared evaluators under confidentiality protocols.
Final Thought
Deterring evolving threats does not always require new infrastructure—it requires a new mindset. Many of the tools already exist; what is needed is strategic alignment, clarity of purpose, and resource-sensitive planning.
The next attack will not wait for bureaucracy to catch up. We are operating in a contested information environment, where narratives are weaponised, identities are fractured, and isolation can radicalise faster than ever before.
The future of counter-terrorism is not about surveillance—it is about situational mastery. It is about knowing when to intervene, how to connect, and who needs help before harm is done.
Violence is not ideology. It is a signal. A signal that something, somewhere, was missed.
Let this be the last signal we ignore.
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